In the prehistoric era human often terified by the mystry of nature.Its the first sign when human think about supernatural power.That the first god come to exist due to terror.The prehistoric shamanism and worship of tree and stone is the raw form of pray.After that human think about two path,One god created us and other god created us but god is in me(Atmatatya).first thought is just the thought of common human and illiterate person.So the first category thought deals with heaven and hell but i m not talking about the thought of god creation.
Talking of 2nd kind thought,let know clearly that
2+2=4 and 2*2=4.Now u may said how stupid its possible that the result of addition and multiplication r same.Actualy i said there is no difference between addition and multiplication,Take another example 2*3=6 and if we converte it inaddition it will be look like 3+3=6.So atma is the object of Addition and paramatma is the result of multiplication.
From pythagorus to Sankaracarya all r the finder of atma,the above phylosophy I mention was a work of pythagorus.
In 5000 bc there is a revolution in the field of atmatatya or findig the truth.
many saint,rishi devotee whole of their life to find that truth,At last the truth come in the form of vedas.
In western country pleto ,socretise all r try to find the ultimate destination.To days many great scientist said that its very harsh question Where the created matterial comes from?
The scientist wheal said
" From time to time,people ask where the created matterial comes from?Well,It does not come from anywhere,material simply appears.At one time the various items composing the material do not exist and a later timethey do.This may seem a very strange idea and i agree it is,but in science it doesnot matter how strange an idea may seem so long as it works,that is to say so long as the idea can be expressed in a precise form and so long as its consequences are found to bemin agreement with observation"
In his last comment Scientist wheal said
"In any case,the whole Idea of creation is queer"
Let wat openhaimer said on this topics
"what physicists call vaguely and rather helplessly'the new particles' are the greatest puzzel in todays physics,but this answer or absence of any answer cannot possibly be allowed to stand as part of any picture of universe establishment of physics,for the idea of creation out of nothing is not science at all,it mere magic."
terminating the falacy of openhaimer
Haold jones said
""Question that are often asked are;What is the matter created out,and what form does it take?It is created out nothing.It must be suppose that there are eternally a true creation going on as a continuous process."
Question that are often asked are;where the created material comes from?
This part,i deals with another comment of Openhaimer;
"An ether hypothesis if accepted,would regard the production of new particles as also of new new radiation or new lines of force,as part of the normal functioning of the customs"
An ether hypothesis if accepted;Now Come to the point,wat Openhaimer said,about some ether hypothesis,where this hypothesis come and who Invented that hypothesis?
Let go back to 1000bc a rishi called kapil wrote one of the uniqe philosophy called "Sankhya".
The Sankhya system is based on Satkaryavada. According to Satkaryavada, the effect pre-exists in the cause. Cause and effect are seen as different temporal aspects of the same thing - the effect lies latent in the cause which in turn seeds the next effect.
More specifically, Sankhya system follows the Prakriti-Parinama Vada. Parinama denotes that the effect is a real transformation of the cause. The cause under consideration here is Prakriti or more precisely Mula-Prakriti (Primordial Matter). The Sankhya system is therefore an exponent of an evolutionary theory of matter beginning with primordial matter. In evolution, Prakriti is transformed and differentiated into multiplicity of objects. Evolution is followed by dissolution. In dissolution the physical existence, all the worldly objects mingle back into Prakriti, which now remains as the undifferentiated, primordial substance. This is how the cycles of evolution and dissolution follow each other.
Lets come to the point and search the answer of this question
where the created material comes from?
where the created material comes from?
Kapila theory is strictly a theory of evalution,he says(Navstuno vastusidhi)A thing made out of nothing."Avastunobhavat Vastusidhirbhavotpatirnav Sambhavit".It is not possible that out of nothing,ie. an entity should arise.(Yadyabhavat bhavatpatistarhi karan rupan karyai drishyat iti jagtopyavastusvan/////)....If an entity were to arise out of non entity,then the character of a cause is visible in its product the world also will be unreal.When the vedantist the monist or the idealist tell kapila,"Let the world too be unreal What harm is that to us?Kapila replies "Abadhat adushtkaran janyatvach navstuutvama"..The world is not unreal because there is no fact contradictony to its reality and became is not the false result of depraved causes(Leading to a belife in what ought not to e belived).
"Ahuktao rajatmiti gyanai naidan rajatmiti gyanat naidan rajatbadh na chatr naidan bbhavroopan jagditi ksyapi gyanan yain bhavroopbadh syat"When there is the notion in regard to a shell of a pearl-oyster(Which sometimes glitters like silver) that it is silver,it is being silver is contradicted by the subsequent and more correct cognation that this is not silver.But in the case in question-that of the world regarded as a reality,no one ever ever has the cognition "this world is not in the shap of entity"by which cognition if any one ever really had such its being an entity might be opposed "Dushtkaran janyatvach mithyatyavgamyatai yatha kamladidoshat peetshankhgyanam ksyachit,atr cha jagatgyanasya sarvaishan srvada stvann doshosti"-And it is held that that is false which is the result of a depraved cause,e.g. Someone's cognition of a white conch-shell as yellow,through such a fault as the janndice which depraves his eye-sight.But in the case in question-that of the world regarded as a reality,there is no such temporary or occasional depravation of the sense because all at all times cognize the world as reality.Therefore the world is not an unreality.
Now from sankhya we come to the point that the matter come from "universal primordial matrix of quiescent energy"
But where is the "universal primordial matrix of quiescent energy" exist?
"Zeal is the fire of love,Active for duty,Burning as it flies"
-Williams.
India is full of philosophy one of the is yoga,In yoga philosophy [color=red]" ahomidam janami"-I am learning."sarbam karmakhilyam partha gyana parisamapyate"All action end after reciving the knowledge " ahomidam janami"-I am learning.here the word "I" is called "Drashtah"-the odience.the word "learning" is called "drishya"-cliping.the mixture of two different entity is not possible if they r truly different.Like the "drashtha" and "drishya" if both r truly different then we not able to mixture them in our mind.But the difference is not eternal its just difference of working,so its virtual.The reflection of a face in a mirror has no real existence apart from the reflected face. So also, the Jiva, who is only the reflection of the Self or Pure Consciousness in the intellect (or mind) has really no separate existence apart from the Self. That Self, which is of the nature of eternal consciousness, I am. When one face is reflected in a number of mirrors the reflections may be of different shapes and sizes, according as the mirror is plain or convex or concave. The reflection in a particular mirror shakes if that mirror shakes. The reflection is hazy if the mirror is not clean. But all these differences in the various reflections do not at all affect the face that is reflected. In the same manner the Jivas or the individual souls which are only reflections of the same Self in different minds have different characteristics, depending on the nature of each mind, but the Self which is the original does not at all take on the characteristics of the minds, but remains ever the same. The Jiva, who is also in reality Pure Consciousness and therefore eternal and infinite, wrongly identifies himself with the particular mind in which he is reflected and with the physical body associated with that mind. Consequently, he looks upon himself as a limited individual and attributes to himself the joys and sorrows, hunger and thirst and old age and death, which all pertain only to the body and mind. The aim of all the Upanishads is to remove this wrong identification.Thats when maya remove,the removal of this false identityfication occured.Patanjalidev called its the line of dimarkation.
About yoga Philosophy
ATHO YOGANONUSHASHANAM II1II
SHRINANTU VISHYA AMRITASHYA PUTRA: II
ATHETI MANGOLADI RASARTHYAKAMBAYAM I
PRATYUHO-PRATIRODHYA SASTRADOU MANGALAM PRAJUJYATA I
DRISHTANUSHRABIK-BISHAYAIJORGO BIOGOBIPAKA EBATYANUBHABABATAM
BHABATI HI PARJYANUJOGO BIPROYOGONANUBI-YOGANUSHASHAN-BHISHYAKO BA I
ATHARBHYATYA BA SASTRAM YOGANONUSHASHANAM NAM I
-First sloka of yoga philosophy is "ATHO YOGANONUSHASHANAM " The word atho in Sanskrit is "Abaya"(The first member of this type of nominal compounds is an indeclinable, to which another word is added so that the new compound also becomes indeclinable).The sloka has six meaning-eg-"mangala",
Prasna(Question),"karjarambhya"(let start action),"Annantar","Adhikar"(occupied) and "Pratigya"(pledge).The word "RASARTHYAKAMBAYAM",means who is the ultimate "rasa" brahma,who is "Annadamay"(full of joy) "Premamai"(Full of love) soul,"Avvayam"(not destroy),"Aparibartaniya"(Changeless).That lord of all soul brahma is bloomed in the mind of "Sadhak" through yoga rahashyam.
later I discuss more about yoga,First its my duty to explain phylosophical thought of Hinduism.Later i discuss about all type of yoga.
Let go to School of purva mimansa
Early Naiyayikas wrote very little about God, i.e., Ishvara (literally, the Supreme Lord). However, later Buddhists in India had become from agnostic to strictly atheistic. As a reaction, the later Naiyayikas entered into disputes with the Buddhists and tried to prove the existence of God through logic. They made this question a challenge to their own existence. They gave the following nine proofs for the existence of God, enlisted in Udayana's Nyaya Kusumanjali:
Kāryāt (lit. "from effect"): An effect is produced by a cause, and similarly, the universe must also have a cause. Causes (according to Naiyayikas) are of three kinds: Samavayi (in case of the universe, the atoms), Asamavayi (the association of atoms) and Nimitta (which is Ishvara). The active cause of the world must have an absolute knowledge of all the material of creation, and hence it must be God. Hence from the creation, the existence of the Creator is proved.
Āyojanāt (lit., from combination): Atoms are inactive and properties are unphysical. So it must be God who creates the world with his will by causing the atoms to join. Self-combination of inanimate and lifeless things is not possible[citation needed], otherwise atoms would only combine at random, creating chaos. There is to be seen the hand of a wise organizer behind the systematic grouping of the ultimate atoms into dyads and molecules. That final organizer is God.
Dhŗité(lit., from support): Just as a material thing falls off without a support, similarly, God is the supporter and bearer of this world, without which the world would not have remained integrated. This universe is hence superintended within God, which proves his existence.
Padāt (lit., from word): Every word has the capability to represent a certain object. It is the will of God that a thing should be represented by a certain word. Similarly, no knowledge can come to us of the different things here unless there is a source of this knowledge. The origin of all knowledge should be omniscient and, consequently, omnipotent. Such a being is not to be seen in this universe, and so it must be outside it. This being is God.
Pratyatah (lit, from faith): the Hindu holy scriptures, the Vedas, are regarded as the source of eternal knowledge. Their knowledge is free from fallacies and are widely believed as a source of proof. Their authors cannot be human beings because human knowledge is limited. They cannot obtain knowledge of past, present, and future, and in depth knowledge of mind. Hence, only God can be the creator of the Vedas. Hence, his existence is proved from his being the author of the Vedas, which he revealed to various sages over a period of time.
Shrutéh (lit., from scriptures): The Shrutis, e.g., the Vedas extol God and talk about his existence. "He is the lord of all subjects, omniscient, and knower of one's internal feelings; He is the creator, cause and destroyer of the world", say the Shrutis. The Shrutis are regarded as a source of proofs by Naiyanikas. Hence, the existence of God is proved.
Vākyāt (lit., from precepts): Again, the Veda must have been produced by a person because it has the nature of "sentences," i.e., the sentences of the Veda were produced by a person because they have the nature of sentences, just as the sentences of beings like ourselves. That person must have been God.
Samkhyāvişheshāt (lit., from the specialty of numbers): The size of a dyad or a molecule depends on the number of the atoms that constitute it. This requisite number of the atoms that form a particular compound could not have been originally the object of the perception of any human being; so its contemplator must be God.
Adŗişhţāt (lit., from the unforeseen): It is seen that some people in this world are happy, some are in misery. Some are rich, and some are poor. The Naiyanikas explain this by the concept of Karma and reincarnation. The fruit of an individual's actions does not always lie within the reach of the individual who is the agent. There ought to be, therefore, a dispenser of the fruits of actions, and this supreme dispenser is God.
Nyaya arguments for monotheism
Not only have the Naiyanikas given proofs for the existence of God, but they have also given an argument that such a God can only be one. In the Nyaya Kusumanjali, this is discussed against the proposition of the Mimamsa school—that let us assume there were many demigods (Devas) and sages (rishis) in the beginning, who wrote the Vedas and created the world. Nyaya says that:
[if they assume such] omniscient beings, those endowed with the various superhuman faculties of assuming infinitesimal size, and so on, and capable of creating everything, then we reply that the law of parsimony bids us assume only one such, namely Him, the adorable Lord. There can be no confidence in a non-eternal and non omniscient being, and hence it follows that according to the system which rejects God, the tradition of the Veda is simultaneously overthrown; there is no other way open.
In other words, Nyaya says that the polytheist would have to give elaborate proofs for the existence and origin of his several celestial spirits, none of which would be logical. So it is much more logical to assume only One, eternal and omniscient God.
About cause
The Nyaya theory of causation
A cause is defined as an unconditional and invariable antecedent of an effect and an effect as an unconditional and invariable consequent of a cause. The same cause produces the same effect; and the same effect is produced by the same cause. The cause is not present in any hidden form whatsoever in its effect.
The following conditions should be met:
The cause must be antencedent [Purvavrtti]
Invariability [Niyatapurvavrtti]
Unconditionality [Ananyathasiddha]
Nyaya recognizes five kinds of accidental antecedents [Anyathasiddha]
Mere accidental antecedent. E.g., The colour of the potter's cloth.
Remote cause is not a cause because it is not unconditional. E.g., The father of the potter.
The co-effects of a cause are not causally related.
Eternal substances, or eternal conditions are not unconditional antecedents. e.g. space.
Unnecessary things, e.g. the donkey of the potter.
Nyaya recognizes three kinds of cause:
Samavayi, material cause. E.g. Thread of a cloth.
Asamavayi, colour of the thread which gives the colour of the cloth.
Nimitta', efficient cause, e.g. the weaver of the cloth.
BrahmaSutra
FIRST ADHYÂYA.
PÂDA I.
The first five adhikaranas lay clown the fundamental positions with regard to Brahman. Adhik. I (1) 1 treats of what the study of the Vedânta presupposes. Adhik. II (2) defines Brahman as that whence the world originates, and so on. Adhik. III (3) declares that Brahman is the source of the Veda. Adhik. IV (4) proves Brahman to be the uniform topic of all Vedânta-texts. Adhik. V (5-11) is engaged in proving by various arguments that the Brahman, which the Vedanta-texts represent as the cause of the world, is an intelligent principle, and cannot be identified with the non-intelligent pradhâna from which the world springs according to the Sânkhyas.
With the next adhikarana there begins a series of discussions of essentially similar character, extending up to the end of the first adhyâya. The question is throughout whether certain terms met with in the Upanishads denote Brahman or some other being, in most cases the gîva, the individual soul. Sankara remarks at the outset that, as the preceding ten Sûtras had settled the all-important point that all the Vedânta-texts refer to Brahman, the question now arises why the enquiry should be continued any further, and thereupon proceeds to explain that the acknowledged distinction of a higher Brahman devoid of all qualities and a lower Brahman characterised by qualities necessitates an investigation whether certain Vedic texts of primâ facie doubtful import set forth the lower Brahman as the object of devout meditation, or the higher Brahman as the object of true knowledge. But that such an investigation is actually carried on in the remaining portion of the first adhyâya, appears neither from the wording of the Sûtras nor even from Sankara's own treatment of the Vedic texts referred to in the Sûtras. In I, 1, 20, for instance, the question is raised whether the golden man within the sphere of the sun, with golden hair and beard and lotus-coloured eyes--of whom the Khândogya Upanishad speaks in I, 6, 6--is an individual soul abiding within the sun or the highest Lord. Sankara's answer is that the passage refers to the Lord, who, for the gratification of his worshippers, manifests himself in a bodily shape made of Mâyâ. So that according to Sankara himself the alternative lies between the saguna Brahman and some particular individual soul, not between the saguna Brahman and the nirguna Brahman.
Adhik. VI (12-19) raises the question whether the ânandamaya, mentioned in Taittirîya Upanishad II, 5, is merely a transmigrating individual soul or the highest Self. Sankara begins by explaining the Sûtras on the latter supposition--and the text of the Sûtras is certainly in favour of that interpretation--gives, however, finally the preference to a different and exceedingly forced explanation according to which the Sûtras teach that the ânandamaya is not Brahman, since the Upanishad expressly says that Brahman is the tail or support of the ânandamaya 1.--Râmânuga's interpretation of Adhikarana VI, although not agreeing in all particulars with the former explanation of Sankara, yet is at one with it in the chief point, viz. that the ânandamaya is Brahman. It further deserves notice that, while Sankara looks on Adhik. VI as the first of a series of interpretatory discussions, all of which treat the question whether certain Vedic passages refer to Brahman or not, Râmânuga separates the adhikarana from the subsequent part of the pâda and connects it with what had preceded. In Adhik. V it had been shown that Brahman cannot be identified with the pradhâna; Adhik. VI shows that it is different from the individual soul, and the proof of the fundamental position of the system is thereby completed 1.--Adhik. VII (20, 31) demonstrates that the golden person seen within the sun and the person seen within the eye, mentioned in Kh. Up. I, 6, are not some individual soul of high eminence, but the supreme Brahman.--Adhik. VIII (22) teaches that by the ether from which, according to Kh. Up. I, 9, all beings originate, not the elemental ether has to be understood but the highest Brahman.--Adhik. IX (23). The prâna also mentioned in Kh. Up. I, ii, 5 denotes the highest Brahman 2--Adhik. X (24-27) teaches that the light spoken of in Kh. Up. III, 13, 7 is not the ordinary physical light but the highest Brahman 3.--Adhik. XI (28-31) decides that the prâna mentioned in Kau. Up. III, 2 is Brahman.
PÂDA II.
Adhik. I (1- shows that the being which consists of mind, whose body is breath, &c., mentioned in Kh. Up. III, 14, is not the individual soul, but Brahman. The Sûtras of this adhikarana emphatically dwell on the difference of the individual soul and the highest Self, whence Sankara is obliged to add an explanation--in his comment on Sûtra 6--to the effect that that difference is to be understood as not real, but as due to the false limiting adjuncts of the highest Self.--The comment of Râmânuga throughout closely follows the words of the Sûtras; on Sûtra 6 it simply remarks that the difference of the highest Self
from the individual soul rests thereon that the former as free from all evil is not subject to the effects of works in the same way as the soul is 1.--Adhik. II (9, 10) decides that he to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food (Katha. Up. I, 2, 25) is the highest Self.--Adhik. III (11, 12) shows that the two entered into the cave (Katha Up. I, 3, 1) are Brahman and the individual soul 2.--Adhik. IV (13-17) shows that the person within the eye mentioned in Kh. Up. IV, 15, 1 is Brahman.--Adhik. V (18-20) shows that the ruler within (antaryâmin) described in Bri. Up. III, 7, 3 is Brahman. Sûtra 2,0 clearly enounces the difference of the individual soul and the Lord; hence Sankara is obliged to remark that that difference is not real.--Adhik. VI (21-23) proves that that which cannot be seen, &c, mentioned in Mundaka Up. I, 1, 3 is Brahman.--Adhik. VII (24-32) shows that the âtman vaisvânara of Kh. Up. V, 11, 6 is Brahman.
PÂDA III.
Adhik. I (1-7) proves that that within which the heaven, the earth, &c. are woven (Mund. Up. II, 2, 5) is Brahman.--Adhik. II (8, 9) shows that the bhûman referred to in Kh. Up. VII, 23 is Brahman.--Adhik. III (10-12) teaches that the Imperishable in which, according to Bri. Up. III, 8, 8, the ether is woven is Brahman.--Adhik. IV (13) decides that the highest person who is to be meditated upon with the syllable Om, according to Prasna Up. V, 5, is not the lower but the higher Brahman.--According to Râmânuga the two alternatives are Brahman and Brahmâ (gîvasa-mashtirûpo # ndâdhipatis katurmukhah).--Adhik. V and VI (comprising, according to--Sankara, Sûtras 14-21) 1 discuss the question whether the small ether within the lotus of the heart mentioned in Kh. Up. VIII, 1 is the elemental ether or the individual soul or Brahman; the last alternative being finally adopted. In favour of the second alternative the pûrvapakshin pleads the two passages Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 4 and VIII, 12, 3, about the serene being (samprasâda); for by the latter the individual soul only can be understood, and in the chapter, of which the latter passage forms part, there are ascribed to it the same qualities (viz. freeness from sin, old age, death, &c.) that were predicated in VIII, 1, of the small ether within the heart.--But the reply to this is, that the second passage refers not to the (ordinary) individual soul but to the soul in that state where its true nature has become manifest, i.e. in which it is Brahman; so that the subject of the passage is in reality not the so-called individual soul but Brahman. And in the former of the two passages the soul is mentioned not on its own account, but merely for the purpose of intimating that the highest Self is the cause through which the individual soul manifests itself in its true nature.--What Râmânuga understands by the âvirbhâva of the soul will appear from the remarks on IV, 4.
The two next Sûtras (22, 23) constitute, according to Sankara, a new adhikarana (VII), proving that he 'after whom everything shines, by whose light all this is lighted' (Katha Up. II, 5,15) is not some material luminous body, but Brahman itself.--According to Râmânuga the two Sûtras do not start a new topic, but merely furnish some further arguments strengthening the conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sûtras.) 2
Adhik. VIII (24, 25) decides that the person of the size of a thumb mentioned in Katha Up. II, 4, 12 is not the individual soul but Brahman.
The two next adhikaranas are of the nature of a digression. The passage about the angushthamâtra was explained on the ground that the human heart is of the size of a span; the question may then be asked whether also such individuals as belong to other classes than mankind, more particularly the Gods, are capable of the knowledge of Brahman: a question finally answered in the affirmative.--This discussion leads in its turn to several other digressions, among which the most important one refers to the problem in what relation the different species of beings stand to the words denoting them (Sûtra 2. In connexion herewith Sankara treats of the nature of words (sabda), opposing the opinion of the Mîmâmsaka Upavarsha, according to whom the word is nothing but the aggregate of its constitutive letters, to the view of the grammarians who teach that over and above the aggregate of the letters there exists a super-sensuous entity called 'sphota,' which is the direct cause of the apprehension of the sense of a word (Adhik. IX; Sûtras 26-33).
Adhik. X (34-3 explains that Sûdras are altogether disqualified for Brahmavidyâ.
Sûtra 39 constitutes, according to Sankara, a new adhikarana (XI), proving that the prâna in which everything trembles, according to Katha Up. II, 6, 2, is Brahman.--According to Râmânuga the Sûtra does not introduce a new topic but merely furnishes an additional reason for the decision arrived at under Sûtras 24, 25, viz. that the angushthamâtra is Brahman. On this supposition, Sûtras 24-39 form one adhikarana in which 26-38 constitute a mere digression led up to by the mention made of the heart in 25.--The angushthamâtra is referred to twice in the Katha Upanishad, once in the passage discussed (II, 4, 12), and once in II, 6, 17 ('the Person not larger than a thumb'). To determine what is meant by the angushthamâtra, Râmânuga says, we are enabled by the passage II, 6, 2, 3, which is intermediate between the two passages concerning the angushthamâtra, and which clearly refers to the highest Brahman, of which alone everything can be said to stand in awe.
The next Sûtra (40) gives rise to a similar difference of opinion. According to Sankara it constitutes by itself a new adhikarana (XII), proving that the 'light' (gyotis) mentioned in Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3 is the highest Brahman.--According to Râmânuga the Sûtra continues the preceding adhikarana, and strengthens the conclusion arrived at by a further argument, referring to Katha Up. II, 5, 15--a passage intermediate between the two passages about the angushthamâtra--which speaks of a primary light that cannot mean anything but Brahman. The Sûtra has in that case to be translated as follows: '(The angushthamâtra is Brahman) because (in a passage intervening between the two) a light is seen to be mentioned (which can be Brahman only).'
The three last Sûtras of the pâda are, according to Sankara, to be divided into two adhikaranas (XIII and XIV), Sûtra 41 deciding that the ether which reveals names and forms (Kh. Up. VIII, 14) is not the elemental ether but Brahman; and 42, 43 teaching that the vigñânamaya, 'he who consists of knowledge,' of Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7 is not the individual soul but Brahman.--According to Râmânuga the three Sûtras make up one single adhikarana discussing whether the Khandogya Upanishad passage about the ether refers to Brahman or to the individual soul in the state of release; the latter of these two alternatives being suggested by the circumstance that the released soul is the subject of the passage immediately preceding ('Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes off his hair,' &c.). Sûtra 41 decides that 'the ether (is Brahman) because the passage designates the nature of something else,' &c. (i.e. of something other than the individual soul; other because to the soul the revealing of names and forms cannot be ascribed, &c.)--But, an objection is raised, does not more than one scriptural passage show that the released soul and Brahman are identical, and is not therefore the ether which reveals names and forms the soul as well as Brahman?--(The two, Sûtra 42 replies, are different) 'because in the states of deep sleep and departing (the highest Self) is designated as different' (from the soul)--which point is proved by the same scriptural passages which Sankara adduces;--and 'because such terms as Lord and the like' cannot be applied to the individual soul (43). Reference is made to IV, 4, 14, where all gagadvyâpâra is said to belong to the Lord only, not to the soul even when in the state of release.
PÂDA IV.
The last pâda of the first adhyâya is specially directed against the Sânkhyas.
The first adhikarana (1-7) discusses the passage Katha Up. I, 3, 10; 11, where mention is made of the Great and the Undeveloped--both of them terms used with a special technical sense in the Sânkhya-sâstra, avyakta being a synonym for pradhâna.--Sankara shows by an exhaustive review of the topics of the Katha Upanishad that the term avyakta has not the special meaning which the Sânkhyas attribute to it, but denotes the body, more strictly the subtle body (sûkshma sarîra), but at the same time the gross body also, in so far as it is viewed as an effect of the subtle one.
Adhik. II (8-10) demonstrates, according to Sankara, that the tricoloured agâ spoken of in Sve. Up. IV, 5 is not the pradhâna of the Sânkhyas, but either that power of the Lord from which the world springs, or else the primary causal matter first produced by that power.--What Râmânuga
in contradistinction from Sankara understands by the primary causal matter, follows from the short sketch given above of the two systems.
Adhik. III (11-13) shows that the pañka pañkaganâh mentioned in Bri. Up. IV, 4, 17 are not the twenty-five principles of the Sânkhyas.--Adhik. IV (14, 15) proves that Scripture does not contradict itself on the all-important point of Brahman, i.e. a being whose essence is intelligence, being the cause of the world.
Adhik. V (16-1 is, according to Sankara, meant to prove that 'he who is the maker of those persons, of whom this is the work,' mentioned in Kau. Up. IV, 19, is not either the vital air or the individual soul, but Brahman.--The subject of the adhikarana is essentially the same in Râmânuga's view; greater stress is, however, laid on the adhikarana being polemical against the Sânkhyas, who wish to turn the passage into an argument for the pradhâna doctrine.
The same partial difference of view is observable with regard to the next adhikarana (VI; Sûtras 19-22) which decides that the 'Self to be seen, to be heard,' &c. (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5) is the highest Self, not the individual soul. This latter passage also is, according to Râmânuga, made the subject of discussion in order to rebut the Sânkhya who is anxious to prove that what is there inculcated as the object of knowledge is not a universal Self but merely the Sânkhya purusha.
Adhik. VII (23-27) teaches that Brahman is not only the efficient or operative cause (nimitta) of the world, but its material cause as well. The world springs from Brahman by way of modification (parinâma; Sûtra 26).--Râmânuga views this adhikarana as specially directed against the Sesvara-sânkhyas who indeed admit the existence of a highest Lord, but postulate in addition an independent pradhâna on which the Lord acts as an operative cause merely.
Adhik. VIII (2 remarks that the refutation of the Sânkhya views is applicable to other theories also, such as the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms.
After this rapid survey of the contents of the first adhyâya and the succinct indication of the most important points in which the views of Sankara and Râmânuga diverge, we turn to a short consideration of two questions which here naturally present themselves, viz., firstly, which is the principle on which the Vedic passages referred to in the Sûtras have been selected and arranged; and, secondly, if, where Sankara and Râmânuga disagree as to the subdivision of the Sûtras into Adhikaranas, and the determination of the Vedic passages discussed in the Sûtras, there are to be met with any indications enabling us to determine which of the two commentators is right. (The more general question as to how far the Sûtras favour either Sankara's or Râmânuga's general views cannot be considered at present.)
The Hindu commentators here and there attempt to point out the reason why the discussion of a certain Vedic passage is immediately followed by the consideration of a certain other one. Their explanations--which have occasionally been referred to in the notes to the translation--rest on the assumption that the Sûtrakâra in arranging the texts to be commented upon was guided by technicalities of the Mîmâmsâ-system, especially by a regard for the various so-called means of proof which the Mîmâmsaka employs for the purpose of determining the proper meaning and position of scriptural passages. But that this was the guiding principle, is rendered altogether improbable by a simple tabular statement of the Vedic passages referred to in the first adhyâya, such as given by Deussen on page 130; for from the latter it appears that the order in which the Sûtras exhibit the scriptural passages follows the order in which those passages themselves occur in the Upanishads, and it would certainly be a most strange coincidence if that order enabled us at the same time to exemplify the various pramânas of the Mîmâmsâ in their due systematic succession.
As Deussen's statement shows, most of the passages discussed are taken from the Khândogya Upanishad, so many indeed that the whole first adhyâya may be said to consist of a discussion of all those Khândogya passages of which it
is doubtful whether they are concerned with Brahman or not, passages from the other Upanishads being brought in wherever an opportunity offers. Considering the prominent position assigned to the Upanishad mentioned, I think it likely that the Sûtrakâra meant to begin the series of doubtful texts with the first doubtful passage from the Khândogya, and that hence the sixth adhikarana which treats of the anândamaya mentioned in the Taittirîya Upanishad has, in agreement with Râmânuga's views, to be separated from the subsequent adhikaranas, and to be combined with the preceding ones whose task it is to lay down the fundamental propositions regarding Brahman's nature.--The remaining adhikaranas of the first pâda follow the order of passages in the Khândogya Upanishad, and therefore call for no remark; with the exception of the last adhikarana, which refers to a Kaushîtaki passage, for whose being introduced in this place I am not able to account.--The first adhikarana of the second pâda returns to the Khândogya Upanishad. The second one treats of a passage in the Katha Upanishad where a being is referred to which eats everything. The reason why that passage is introduced in this place seems to be correctly assigned in the Srî-bhâshya, which remarks that, as in the preceding Sûtra it had been argued that the highest Self is not an enjoyer, a doubt arises whether by that being which eats everything the highest Self can be meant 1.--The third adhikarana again, whose topic is the 'two entered into the cave' (Katha Up. I, 3, 1), appears, as Râmânuga remarks, to come in at this place owing to the preceding adhikarana; for if it could not be proved that one of the two is the highest Self, a doubt would attach to the explanation given above of the 'eater' since the 'two entered into the cave,' and the 'eater' stand under the same prakarana, and must therefore be held to refer to the same matter.--The fourth adhikarana is again occupied with a Khândogya passage.--The fifth adhikarana, whose topic is the Ruler within (antaryâmin), manifestly owes its place, as remarked by Râmânuga also,
to the fact that the Vedic passage treated had been employed in the preceding adhikarana (I, 2, 14) for the purpose of strengthening the argument 1.--The sixth adhikarana, again, which discusses 'that which is not seen' (adresya; Mund. Up. I, 1, 6), is clearly introduced in this place because in the preceding adhikarana it had been said that adrishta, &c. denote the highest Self;--The reasons to which the last adhikarana of the second pâda and the first and third adhikaranas of the third pâda owe their places are not apparent (the second adhikarana of the third pâda treats of a Khândogya passage). The introduction, on the other hand, of the passage from the Prasna Upanishad treating of the akshara Omkâra is clearly due to the circumstance that an akshara, of a different nature, had been discussed in the preceding adhikarana.--The fifth and sixth adhikaranas investigate Khândogya passages.--The two next Sûtras (22, 23) are, as remarked above, considered by Sankara to constitute a new adhikarana treating of the 'being after which everything shines' (Mund. Up. II, 2, 10); while Râmânuga looks on them as continuing the sixth adhikarana. There is one circumstance which renders it at any rate probable that Râmânuga, and not Sankara, here hits the intention of the author of the Sûtras. The general rule in the first three pâdas is that, wherever a new Vedic passage is meant to be introduced, the subject of the discussion, i.e. that being which in the end is declared to be Brahman is referred to by means of a special word, in most cases a nominative form 2. From this rule there is in the preceding part of the adhyâya only one real exception, viz. in I, 2, 1, which possibly may be due to the fact that there a new pâda begins, and it therefore was considered superfluous
to indicate the introduction of a new topic by a special word. The exception supplied by I, 3, 19 is only an apparent one; for, as remarked above, Sûtra 19 does not in reality begin a new adhikarana. A few exceptions occurring later on will be noticed in their places.--Now neither Sutra 22 nor Sutra 23 contains any word intimating that a new Vedic passage is being taken into consideration, and hence it appears preferable to look upon them, with Râmânuga, as continuing the topic of the preceding adhikarana.--This conclusion receives an additional confirmation from the position of the next adhikarana, which treats of the being 'a span long' mentioned in Katha Up. II, 4, 12; for the reason of this latter passage being considered here is almost certainly the reference to the alpasruti in Sûtra 21, and, if so, the angushthamâtra properly constitutes the subject of the adhikarana immediately following on Adhik. V, VI; which, in its turn, implies that Sutras 22, 23 do not form an independent adhikarana.--The two next adhikaranas are digressions, and do not refer to special Vedic passages.--Sutra 39 forms anew adhikarana, according to Sankara, but not according to Râmânuga, whose opinion seems again to be countenanced by the fact that the Sûtra does not exhibit any word indicative of a new topic. The same difference of opinion prevails with regard to Sûtra 40, and it appears from the translation of the Sûtra given above, according to Râmânuga's view, that 'gyotih' need not be taken as a nominative.--The last two adhikaranas finally refer, according to Râmânuga, to one Khandogya passage only, and here also we have to notice that Sûtra 42 does not comprise any word intimating that a new passage is about to be discussed.
From all this we seem entitled to draw the following conclusions. The Vedic passages discussed in the three first pâdas of the Vedânta-sûtras comprise all the doubtful--or at any rate all the more important doubtful--passages from the Khandogya Upanishad. These passages are arranged in the order in which the text of the Upanishad exhibits them. Passages from other Upanishads are discussed as opportunities offer, there being always a special reason why a certain Khandogya passage is followed by
a certain passage from some other Upanishad. Those reasons can be assigned with sufficient certainty in a number of cases although not in all, and from among those passages whose introduction cannot be satisfactorily accounted for some are eliminated by our following the subdivision of the Sûtras into adhikaranas adopted by Râmânuga, a subdivision countenanced by the external form of the Sûtras.
The fourth pâda of the first adhyâya has to be taken by itself. It is directed specially and avowedly against Sânkhya-interpretations of Scripture, not only in its earlier part which discusses isolated passages, but also--as is brought out much more clearly in the Srî-bhâshya than by Sankara--in its latter part which takes a general survey of the entire scriptural evidence for Brahman being the material as well as the operative cause of the world.
Deussen (p. 221) thinks that the selection made by the Sûtrakâra of Vedic passages setting forth the nature of Brahman is not in all cases an altogether happy one. But this reproach rests on the assumption that the passages referred to in the first adhyâya were chosen for the purpose of throwing light on what Brahman is, and this assumption can hardly be upheld. The Vedânta-sûtras as well as the Pûrvâ Mîmâmsâ-sûtras are throughout Mîmâmsâ i.e. critical discussions of such scriptural passages as on a primâ facie view admit of different interpretations and therefore necessitate a careful enquiry into their meaning. Here and there we meet with Sutrâs which do not directly involve a discussion of the sense of some particular Vedic passage, but rather make a mere statement on some important point. But those cases are rare, and it would be altogether contrary to the general spirit of the Sutrâs to assume that a whole adhyâya should be devoted to the task of showing what Brahman is. The latter point is sufficiently determined in the first five (or six) adhikaranas; but after we once know what Brahman is we are at once confronted by a number of Upanishad passages concerning which it is doubtful whether they refer to Brahman or not. With their discussion all the remaining adhikaranas of the first adhyâya are occupied. That the Vedânta-sûtras view it as a particularly important task to controvert the doctrine of the Sânkhyas is patent (and has also been fully pointed out by Deussen, p. 23). The fifth adhikarana already declares itself against the doctrine that the world has sprung from a non-intelligent principle, the pradhâna, and the fourth pâda of the first adhyâya returns to an express polemic against Sânkhya interpretations of certain Vedic statements. It is therefore perhaps not saying too much if we maintain that the entire first adhyâya is due to the wish, on the part of the Sûtrakâra, to guard his own doctrine against Sânkhya attacks. Whatever the attitude of the other so-called orthodox systems may be towards the Veda, the Sânkhya system is the only one whose adherents were anxious--and actually attempted--to prove that their views are warranted by scriptural passages. The Sânkhya tendency thus would be to show that all those Vedic texts which the Vedântin claims as teaching the existence of Brahman, the intelligent and sole cause of the world, refer either to the pradhâna or some product of the pradhâna, or else to the purusha in the Sânkhya sense, i.e. the individual soul. It consequently became the task of the Vedântin to guard the Upanishads against misinterpretations of the kind, and this he did in the first adhyâya of the Vedânta-sûtras, selecting those passages about whose interpretation doubts were, for some reason or other, likely to arise. Some of the passages singled out are certainly obscure, and hence liable to various interpretations; of others it is less apparent why it was thought requisite to discuss them at length. But this is hardly a matter in which we are entitled to find fault with the Sûtrakâra; for no modern scholar, either European or Hindu, is--or can possibly be--sufficiently at home, on the one hand, in the religious and philosophical views which prevailed at the time when the Sûtras may have been composed, and, on the other hand, in the intricacies of the Mîmâmsâ, to judge with confidence which Vedic passages may give rise to discussions and which not.
End of priliminary "Bartika" of 1st chapter.
Meaning of 1st pada
It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and the subject whose respective spheres are the notion of the 'Thou' (the Non-Ego) and the 'Ego,' and which are opposed to each other as much as darkness and light are, cannot be identified. All the less can their respective attributes be identified. Hence it follows that it is wrong to superimpose upon the subject--whose Self is intelligence, and which has for its sphere the notion of the Ego--the object whose sphere is the notion of the Non-Ego, and the attributes of the object, and vice versâ to superimpose the subject and the attributes of the subject on the object. In spite of this it is on the part of man a natural procedure--which has its cause in wrong knowledge--not to distinguish the two entities (object and subject) and their respective attributes, although they are absolutely distinct, but to superimpose upon each the characteristic nature and the attributes of the other, and thus, coupling the Real and the Unreal, to make use of expressions such as 'That am I,' 'That is mine.'--But what have we to understand by the term 'superimposition?'--The apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something previously observed, in some other thing.
Some indeed define the term 'superimposition' as the superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another thing. Others, again, define superimposition as the error founded on the non-apprehension of the difference of that which is superimposed from that on which it is superimposed. Others, again, define it as the fictitious assumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing on which something else is superimposed. But all these definitions agree in so far as they represent superimposition as the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another thing. And therewith agrees also the popular view which is exemplified by expressions such as the following: 'Mother-of-pearl appears like silver,' 'The moon although one only appears as if she were double.' But how is it possible that on the interior Self which itself is not an object there should be superimposed objects and their attributes? For every one superimposes an object only on such other objects as are placed before him (i.e. in contact with his sense-organs), and you have said before that the interior Self which is entirely disconnected from the idea of the Thou (the Non-Ego) is never an object. It is not, we reply, non-object in the absolute sense. For it is the object of the notion of the Ego, and the interior Self is well known to exist on account of its immediate (intuitive) presentation. Nor is it an exceptionless rule that objects can be superimposed only on such other objects as are before us, i.e. in contact with our sense-organs; for non-discerning men superimpose on the ether, which is not the object of sensuous perception, dark-blue colour.
Hence it follows that the assumption of the Non-Self being superimposed on the interior Self is not unreasonable.
This superimposition thus defined, learned men consider to be Nescience (avidyâ), and the ascertainment of the true nature of that which is (the Self) by means of the discrimination of that (which is superimposed on the Self), they call knowledge (vidyâ). There being such knowledge (neither the Self nor the Non-Self) are affected in the least by any blemish or (good) quality produced by their mutual superimposition. The mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self, which is termed Nescience, is the presupposition on which there base all the practical distinctions--those made in ordinary life as well as those laid down by the Veda--between means of knowledge, objects of knowledge (and knowing persons), and all scriptural texts, whether they are concerned with injunctions and prohibitions (of meritorious and non-meritorious actions), or with final release.--But how can the means of right knowledge such as perception, inference, &c., and scriptural texts have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience?--Because, we reply, the means of right knowledge cannot operate unless there be a knowing personality, and because the existence of the latter depends on the erroneous notion that the body, the senses, and so on, are identical with, or belong to, the Self of the knowing person. For without the employment of the senses, perception and the other means of right knowledge cannot operate. And without a basis (i.e. the body) the senses cannot act. Nor does anybody act by means of a body on which the nature of the Self is not superimposed. Nor can, in the absence of all that, the Self which, in its own nature is free from all contact, become a knowing agent. And if there is no knowing agent, the means of right knowledge cannot operate (as said above).
Hence perception and the other means of right knowledge, and the Vedic texts have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience. (That human cognitional activity has for its presupposition the superimposition described above), follows also from the non-difference in that respect of men from animals. Animals, when sounds or other sensible qualities affect their sense of hearing or other senses, recede or advance according as the idea derived from the sensation is a comforting or disquieting one. A cow, for instance, when she sees a man approaching with a raised stick in his hand, thinks that he wants to beat her, and therefore moves away; while she walks up to a man who advances with some fresh grass in his hand. Thus men also--who possess a higher intelligence--run away when they see strong fierce-looking fellows drawing near with shouts and brandishing swords; while they confidently approach persons of contrary appearance and behaviour. We thus see that men and animals follow the same course of procedure with reference to the means and objects of knowledge. Now it is well known that the procedure of animals bases on the non-distinction (of Self and Non-Self); we therefore conclude that, as they present the same appearances, men also--although distinguished by superior intelligence--proceed with regard to perception and so on, in the same way as animals do; as long, that is to say, as the mutual superimposition of Self and Non-Self lasts.
With reference again to that kind of activity which is founded on the Veda (sacrifices and the like), it is true indeed that the reflecting man who is qualified to enter on it, does so not without knowing that the Self has a relation to another world; yet that qualification does not depend on the knowledge, derivable from the Vedânta-texts, of the true nature of the Self as free from all wants, raised above the distinctions of the Brâhmana and Kshattriya-classes and so on, transcending transmigratory existence. For such knowledge is useless and even contradictory to the claim (on the part of sacrificers, &c. to perform certain actions and enjoy their fruits). And before such knowledge of the Self has arisen, the Vedic texts continue in their operation, to have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience. For such texts as the following, 'A Brâhmana is to sacrifice,' are operative only on the supposition that on the Self are superimposed particular conditions such as caste, stage of life, age, outward circumstances, and so on. That by superimposition we have to understand the notion of something in some other thing we have already explained. (The superimposition of the Non-Self will be understood more definitely from the following examples.) Extra-personal attributes are superimposed on the Self, if a man considers himself sound and entire, or the contrary, as long as his wife, children, and so on are sound and entire or not. Attributes of the body are superimposed on the Self, if a man thinks of himself (his Self) as stout, lean, fair, as standing, walking, or jumping. Attributes of the sense-organs, if he thinks 'I am mute, or deaf, or one-eyed, or blind.' Attributes of the internal organ when he considers himself subject to desire, intention, doubt, determination, and so on. Thus the producer of the notion of the Ego (i.e. the internal organ) is superimposed on the interior Self, which, in reality, is the witness of all the modifications of the internal organ, and vice versâ the interior Self, which is the witness of everything, is superimposed on the internal organ, the senses, and so on. In this way there goes on this natural beginning--and endless superimposition, which appears in the form of wrong conception, is the cause of individual souls appearing as agents and enjoyers (of the results of their actions), and is observed by every one.
With a view to freeing one's self from that wrong notion which is the cause of all evil and attaining thereby the knowledge of the absolute unity of the Self the study of the Vedânta-texts is begun. That all the Vedânta-texts have the mentioned purport we shall show in this so-called Sârîraka-mîmâmsâ.
The word 'then' is here to be taken as denoting immediate consecution; not as indicating the introduction of a new subject to be entered upon; for the enquiry into Brahman (more literally, the desire of knowing Brahman) is not of that nature. Nor has the word 'then' the sense of auspiciousness (or blessing); for a word of that meaning could not be properly construed as a part of the sentence. The word 'then' rather acts as an auspicious term by being pronounced and heard merely, while it denotes at the same time something else, viz. immediate consecution as said above. That the latter is its meaning follows moreover from the circumstance that the relation in which the result stands to the previous topic (viewed as the cause of the result) is non-separate from the relation of immediate consecution.
If, then, the word 'then' intimates immediate consecution it must be explained on what antecedent the enquiry into Brahman specially depends; just as the enquiry into active religious duty (which forms the subject of the Pûrvâ Mîmâmsâ) specially depends on the antecedent reading of the Veda. The reading of the Veda indeed is the common antecedent (for those who wish to enter on an enquiry into religious duty as well as for those desirous of knowing Brahman). The special question with regard to the enquiry into Brahman is whether it presupposes as its antecedent the understanding of the acts of religious duty (which is acquired by means of the Pûrvâ Mîmâmsâ). To this question we reply in the negative, because for a man who has read the Vedânta-parts of the Veda it is possible to enter on the enquiry into Brahman even before engaging in the enquiry into religious duty. Nor is it the purport of the word 'then' to indicate order of succession; a purport which it serves in other passages, as, for instance, in the one enjoining the cutting off of pieces from the heart and other parts of the sacrificial animal. (For the intimation of order of succession could be intended only if the agent in both cases were the same; but this is not the case), because there is no proof for assuming the enquiry into religious duty and the enquiry into Brahman to stand in the relation of principal and subordinate matter or the relation of qualification (for a certain act) on the part of the person qualified; and because the result as well as the object of the enquiry differs in the two cases. The knowledge of active religious duty has for its fruit transitory felicity, and that again depends on the performance of religious acts. The enquiry into Brahman, on the other hand, has for its fruit eternal bliss, and does not depend on the performance of any acts. Acts of religious duty do not yet exist at the time when they are enquired into, but are something to be accomplished (in the future); for they depend on the activity of man. In the Brahma-mîmâmsâ, on the other hand, the object of enquiry, i.e. Brahman, is something already accomplished (existent),--for it is eternal,--and does not depend on human energy. The two enquiries differ moreover in so far as the operation of their respective fundamental texts is concerned. For the fundamental texts on which active religious duty depends convey information to man in so far only as they enjoin on him their own particular subjects (sacrifices, &c.); while the fundamental texts about Brahman merely instruct man, without laying on him the injunction of being instructed, instruction being their immediate result. The case is analogous to that of the information regarding objects of sense which ensues as soon as the objects are approximated to the senses. It therefore is requisite that something should be stated subsequent to which the enquiry into Brahman is proposed.--Well, then, we maintain that the antecedent conditions are the discrimination of what is eternal and what is non-eternal; the renunciation of all desire to enjoy the fruit (of one's actions) both here and hereafter; the acquirement of tranquillity, self-restraint, and the other means, and the desire of final release. If these conditions exist, a man may, either before entering on an enquiry into active religious duty or after that, engage in the enquiry into Brahman and come to know it; but not otherwise. The word 'then' therefore intimates that the enquiry into Brahman is subsequent to the acquisition of the above-mentioned (spiritual) means.
The word 'therefore' intimates a reason. Because the Veda, while declaring that the fruit of the agnihotra and similar performances which are means of happiness is non-eternal (as, for instance. Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 6, 'As here on earth whatever has been acquired by action perishes so perishes in the next world whatever is acquired by acts of religious duty'), teaches at the same time that the highest aim of man is realised by the knowledge of Brahman (as, for instance, Taitt. Up. II, I, 'He who knows Brahman attains the highest'); therefore the enquiry into Brahman is to be undertaken subsequently to the acquirement of the mentioned means.
By Brahman is to be understood that the definition of which will be given in the next Sûtra (I, 1, 2); it is therefore not to be supposed that the word Brahman may here denote something else, as, for instance, the brahminical caste. In the Sûtra the genitive case ('of Brahman;' the literal translation of the Sûtra being 'then therefore the desire of knowledge of Brahman') denotes the object, not something generally supplementary (sesha); for the desire of knowledge demands an object of desire and no other such object is stated.--But why should not the genitive case be taken as expressing the general complementary relation (to express which is its proper office)? Even in that case it might constitute the object of the desire of knowledge, since the general relation may base itself on the more particular one.--This assumption, we reply, would mean that we refuse to take Brahman as the direct object, and then again indirectly introduce it as the object; an altogether needless procedure.--Not needless; for if we explain the words of the Sûtra to mean 'the desire of knowledge connected with Brahman' we thereby virtually promise that also all the heads of discussion which bear on Brahman will be treated.--This reason also, we reply, is not strong enough to uphold your interpretation. For the statement of some principal matter already implies all the secondary matters connected therewith. Hence if Brahman, the most eminent of all objects of knowledge, is mentioned, this implies already all those objects of enquiry which the enquiry into Brahman presupposes, and those objects need therefore not be mentioned, especially in the Sûtra. Analogously the sentence 'there the king is going' implicitly means that the king together with his retinue is going there. Our interpretation (according to which the Sûtra represents Brahman as the direct object of knowledge) moreover agrees with Scripture, which directly represents Brahman as the object of the desire of knowledge; compare, for instance, the passage, 'That from whence these beings are born, &c., desire to know that. That is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, I). With passages of this kind the Sûtra only agrees if the genitive case is taken to denote the object. Hence we do take it in that sense. The object of the desire is the knowledge of Brahman up to its complete comprehension, desires having reference to results. Knowledge thus constitutes the means by which the complete comprehension of Brahman is desired to be obtained. For the complete comprehension of Brahman is the highest end of man, since it destroys the root of all evil such as Nescience, the seed of the entire Samsâra. Hence the desire of knowing Brahman is to be entertained.
But, it may be asked, is Brahman known or not known (previously to the enquiry into its nature)? If it is known we need not enter on an enquiry concerning it; if it is not known we can not enter on such an enquiry.
We reply that Brahman is known. Brahman, which is all-knowing and endowed with all powers, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom, exists. For if we consider the derivation of the word 'Brahman,' from the root brih, 'to be great,' we at once understand that eternal purity, and so on, belong to Brahman. Moreover the existence of Brahman is known on the ground of its being the Self of every one. For every one is conscious of the existence of (his) Self, and never thinks 'I am not.' If the existence of the Self were not known, every one would think 'I am not.' And this Self (of whose existence all are conscious) is Brahman. But if Brahman is generally known as the Self, there is no room for an enquiry into it! Not so, we reply; for there is a conflict of opinions as to its special nature. Unlearned people and the Lokâyatikas are of opinion that the mere body endowed with the quality of intelligence is the Self; others that the organs endowed with intelligence are the Self; others maintain that the internal organ is the Self; others, again, that the Self is a mere momentary idea; others, again, that it is the Void. Others, again (to proceed to the opinion of such as acknowledge the authority of the Veda), maintain that there is a transmigrating being different from the body, and so on, which is both agent and enjoyer (of the fruits of action); others teach that that being is enjoying only, not acting; others believe that in addition to the individual souls, there is an all-knowing, all-powerful Lord. Others, finally, (i.e. the Vedântins) maintain that the Lord is the Self of the enjoyer (i.e. of the individual soul whose individual existence is apparent only, the product of Nescience).
Thus there are many various opinions, basing part of them on sound arguments and scriptural texts, part of them on fallacious arguments and scriptural texts misunderstood. If therefore a man would embrace some one of these opinions without previous consideration, he would bar himself from the highest beatitude and incur grievous loss. For this reason the first Sûtra proposes, under the designation of an enquiry into Brahman, a disquisition of the Vedânta-texts, to be carried on with the help of conformable arguments, and having for its aim the highest beatitude.
So far it has been said that Brahman is to be enquired into. The question now arises what the characteristics of that Brahman are, and the reverend author of the Sûtras therefore propounds the following aphorism.
2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c. (i.e. the origin, subsistence, and dissolution) of this (world proceed).
The term, &c. implies subsistence and re-absorption. That the origin is mentioned first (of the three) depends on the declaration of Scripture as well as on the natural development of a substance. Scripture declares the order
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of succession of origin, subsistence, and dissolution in the passage, Taitt. Up. III, I, 'From whence these beings are born,' &c. And with regard to the second reason stated, it is known that a substrate of qualities can subsist and be dissolved only after it has entered, through origination, on the state of existence. The words 'of this' denote that substrate of qualities which is presented to us by perception and the other means of right knowledge; the genitive case indicates it to be connected with origin, &c. The words 'from which' denote the cause. The full sense of the Sûtra therefore is: That omniscient omnipotent cause from which proceed the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of this world--which world is differentiated by names and forms, contains many agents and enjoyers, is the abode of the fruits of actions, these fruits having their definite places, times, and causes 1, and the nature of whose arrangement cannot even be conceived by the mind,--that cause, we say, is Brahman. Since the other forms of existence (such as increase, decline, &c.) are included in origination, subsistence, and dissolution, only the three latter are referred to in the Sûtra. As the six stages of existence enumerated by Yâska 2 are possible only during the period of the world's subsistence, it might--were they referred to in the Sûtra--be suspected that what is meant are not the origin, subsistence, and dissolution (of the world) as dependent on the first cause. To preclude this suspicion the Sûtra is to be taken as referring, in addition to the world's origination from Brahman, only to its subsistence in Brahman, and final dissolution into Brahman.
The origin, &c. of a world possessing the attributes stated above cannot possibly proceed from anything else but a Lord possessing the stated qualities; not either from a non-intelligent prâdhana 3, or from atoms, or from non-being,
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or from a being subject to transmigration 1; nor, again, can it proceed from its own nature (i.e. spontaneously, without a cause), since we observe that (for the production of effects) special places, times, and causes have invariably to be employed.
(Some of) those who maintain a Lord to be the cause of the world 2, think that the existence of a Lord different from mere transmigrating beings can be inferred by means of the argument stated just now (without recourse being had to Scripture at all).--But, it might be said, you yourself in the Sûtra under discussion have merely brought forward the same argument!--By no means, we reply. The Sûtras (i.e. literally 'the strings') have merely the purpose of stringing together the flowers of the Vedânta-passages. In reality the Vedânta-passages referred to by the Sûtras are discussed here. For the comprehension of Brahman is effected by the ascertainment, consequent on discussion, of the sense of the Vedânta-texts, not either by inference or by the other means of right knowledge. While, however, the Vedânta-passages primarily declare the cause of the origin, &c., of the world, inference also, being an instrument of right knowledge in so far as it does not contradict the Vedânta-texts, is not to be excluded as a means of confirming the meaning ascertained. Scripture itself, moreover, allows argumentation; for the passages, Bri. Up. II, 4, 5 ('the Self is to be heard, to be considered'), and Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2 ('as the man, &c., having been informed, and being able to judge for himself, would arrive at Gandhâra, in the same way a man who meets with a teacher obtains knowledge'), declare that human understanding assists Scripture 3.
Scriptural text, &c. 4, are not, in the enquiry into Brahman,
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the only means of knowledge, as they are in the enquiry into active duty (i.e. in the Pûrva Mimâmsâ), but scriptural texts on the one hand, and intuition 1, &c., on the other hand, are to be had recourse to according to the occasion: firstly, because intuition is the final result of the enquiry into Brahman; secondly, because the object of the enquiry is an existing (accomplished) substance. If the object of the knowledge of Brahman were something to be accomplished, there would be no reference to intuition, and text, &c., would be the only means of knowledge. The origination of something to be accomplished depends, moreover, on man since any action either of ordinary life, or dependent on the Veda may either be done or not be done, or be done in a different way. A man, for instance, may move on either by means of a horse, or by means of his feet, or by some other means, or not at all. And again (to quote examples of actions dependent on the Veda), we meet in Scripture with sentences such as the following: 'At the atirâtra he takes the shodasin cup,' and 'at the atirâtra he does not take the shodasin cup;' or, 'he makes the oblation after the sun has risen,' and, 'he makes the oblation when the sun has not yet risen.' Just as in the quoted instances, injunctions and prohibitions, allowances of optional procedure, general rules and exceptions have their place, so they would have their place with regard to Brahman also (if the latter were a thing to be accomplished). But the fact is that no option is possible as to whether a substance is to be thus or thus, is to be or not to be. All option depends on the notions of man; but the knowledge of the real nature of a thing does not depend on the notions of man, but only on the thing itself. For to think with regard to a post, 'this is a post or a man, or something else,' is not knowledge of truth; the two ideas, 'it is a man or something else,' being false, and only the third idea, 'it
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is a post,' which depends on the thing itself, falling under the head of true knowledge. Thus true knowledge of all existing things depends on the things themselves, and hence the knowledge of Brahman also depends altogether on the thing, i.e. Brahman itself.--But, it might be said, as Brahman is an existing substance, it will be the object of the other means of right knowledge also, and from this it follows that a discussion of the Vedânta-texts is purposeless.--This we deny; for as Brahman is not an object of the senses, it has no connection with those other means of knowledge. For the senses have, according to their nature, only external things for their objects, not Brahman. If Brahman were an object of the senses, we might perceive that the world is connected with Brahman as its effect; but as the effect only (i.e. the world) is perceived, it is impossible to decide (through perception) whether it is connected with Brahman or something else. Therefore the Sûtra under discussion is not meant to propound inference (as the means of knowing Brahman), but rather to set forth a Vedânta-text.--Which, then, is the Vedânta-text which the Sûtra points at as having to be considered with reference to the characteristics of Brahman?--It is the passage Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'Bhrigu Vâruni went to his father Varuna, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman,' &c., up to 'That from whence these beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into which they enter at their death, try to know that. That is Brahman.' The sentence finally determining the sense of this passage is found III, 6: 'From bliss these beings are born; by bliss, when born, they, live; into bliss they enter at their death.' Other passages also are to be adduced which declare the cause to be the almighty Being, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom
Dear all divine friend last post I discuss just a pada of Brahmasutra but u see that brahmasutra is vast books and its not possible for me to write all the pada and its "bartika" and "tika" so I think when we need some sloka of brahmasutra we just use this and then write the "tika" Also dear divine friends if u some times unable to understand some topics pls post ur comment then I try to simplify the topics.Again thanks for reading atma gyan,and wish lets all of us enlighted and personally feel and see the god.
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Realisation of atma
Aitareya Upanishad
The Aitareya Upanishad belongs to the Rig Veda and is part of the Aitareya Aranyaka.
This Upanishad is for those who have turned away from the world, whose minds are free and collected, and who are ready to acquire the knowledge of the Supreme Reality that Brahman is all pervading. He is present in all creatures whether small or big, moving or non-moving. The basis of the entire creation is Brahman the Pure Consciousness.
This Upanishad concludes by saying that a person, who realizes his oneness with the Pure Consciousness, becomes immortal.
That means he/she/any creatures soul attained the moksha.The word immortal if we translet it in sanskrite it is called "Amrita".That means those soul unified with ultimate.
Katha Upanishad
This Upanishad belongs to the Taittiriya Shaakhaa of the Krishna Yajur Veda. It begins with a story and is in the form of a dialogue. According to this story. A poor and pious Brahmana, Vajasravasa, performs the Visvajit sacrifice and gives as presents to the priests a few old and feeble cows. His son, Naciketas, is disturbed by his father's offerings and proposes that he himself may be offered as offering to a priest. His father declined to accept the proposal. When Naciketas persisted, his father in rage asked him to go to Yama (the God of death). Naciketas goes to the abode of Yama and there waits for him for three days and three nights without any food. On his return, Yama offers three gifts as compensation for the delay and discomfort caused to Naciketas. Nachiketas asked for three boons:
1) He be returned alive to his father and his father should not have any anger towards him.
2) He asked Yama to teach him the sacrifice, by the performance of which he can enter heaven and be freed from hunger, thirst, fear and sorrow. (Later on this sacrifice was renamed as the Nachiketaagni).
3) He wanted to know from Yama, what happens to man after he is dead.
The first two boons were readily granted by Yama. As regards the third boon, Yama tries to discourage Nachiketas from asking this question. Instead he tries to tempt Nachiketas by offering him wealth, progeny, kingship, etc. Nachiketas refused all these offers and insisted on knowing about life after death. The central theme of the Katha Upanishad is the dialogue between Yama and Nachiketas around the third boon.
Yama is very pleased with Nachiketas for not being tempted by worldly possessions and pleasures and makes the distinction between the Good and the Pleasant. Worldly interests such as power, wealth, family etc. constitute the pleasant. Spiritual values and interest in them constitute the good. The path of the 'pleasant' leads to ignorance and the path of the 'good' lead to Knowledge. Yama is happy that Nachiketas has chosen the good and so is qualified to receive Knowledge.
Yama goes on to say that ignorant people who are deluded by worldly pleasures, who are devoid of discrimination, who are heedless and who think that "this world alone exists, and there is no other" are caught in the cycle of birth and death, pleasure and pain. These people are not fit to receive knowledge.
Yama goes on to say that the wise man who not only discards the fulfillment of worldly desires but also the desire to enter heaven where there is no fear, sorrow or death, such a wise man by concentrating on the Self, realizes the Self.
It is further stated in this Upanishad that this God Knowledge or Self-realisation cannot be acquired by reasoning or by the study of the scriptures. For Self-realisation, one must be chosen by God. Then by God's grace and with the help of an able teacher the person will be able to realize the Self. It is also explained how through Yoga methodology the breath and the senses can be controlled and the need for moral probity to lead a spiritual life.
A lot of importance is placed on the role of the teacher or Guru who helps one to realize the Self. This is well expressed through the following verses:
"A seeker cannot find his way to God unless he is told of God by another."
Katha Upanishad
"Arise! Awake! Approach the great and learn. Like the sharp edge of a razor is the path, so the wise say - hard to tread and difficult to cross."
Katha Upanishad
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The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishad (Sanskrit: बृहदारण्यक उपनिषद्)
This Upanishad, the Brhadaranyaka, which we are trying to study, is a very lengthy text, ranging from thought to thought, in various stages of development; and I have particularly found that it is something like a very elaborate commentary on one of the Master-hymns of the Veda, that is, the Purusha-Sukta. Some others have thought that it is an exposition of the principles of the Isavasya Upanishad. It may be that they are right. But I, in my own humble way, tried to discover another meaning in it when I studied it and contemplated upon it - that it is a vast body of exposition of the inner significance of the Purusha-Sukta and, perhaps, also, of the Nasadiya-Sukta, where the Cosmic Person is described, and creation hailed, about which we shall be studying, shortly, stage by stage.
The Upanishad begins with a startling exposition of the very methodology of living adopted in our country. As I tried to mention to you, the method of the Upanishad is secret, esoteric and intended to go into the meaning of action which is otherwise exoteric. I have also mentioned that the Veda has an aspect, namely, the ritual aspect, the aspect of sacrifice, performance of religious ceremony by the application of the Mantras of the Samhitas, as expounded in the section known as the Brahmanas. The Aranyakas go to the contemplated side of the Brahmanas, and tell us that a sacrifice need not necessarily be outward; itcan also be inward; and the inward is as powerful as the outward. It can even be more powerful than the outward. The ritual that is performed by the mind, say the Aranyakas, is more puissant in the production of effect than the ritual that is outwardly performed through the sacred fire, or in the holy altar. The entire range of the Aranyakas is filled with this meaning, that mental action is a greater action than outward action. Its capacity is greater than external activity. Thought is more potent than word and deed. This principle is carried to its logical limit in the Upanishads.
If thought is more potent than action, there may be something more potent than even thought; greater than thought, and more powerful than thought, which can explore even the content of thought itself. If action is superseded by thought, thought is superseded by 'being'. So, we go to the Upanishads where the principle of 'being' is expounded as transcendent even to the operations of thought, which, otherwise, are superior to all action outside. The range of the Upanishads, expounding the character of 'being' as transcendent to thought of every type, is very wide, and no one can understand a Upanishad unless one understands what 'being' is. We cannot even know what thought is, far from knowing what 'being' is. We can know how we think at a particular time, but we cannot know exactly what mind is, what thought is, where it is situated, and how it acts. The reason is that what we call the mind or thought is involved in a process. Inasmuch as it is involved in a process or transition, it becomes difficult of exposition and investigation. And what are the processes in which thought, or the mind, is involved? Everything that we call outward life - in that the mind is involved. We always think in terms of some thing. That something is what we call life, or at least an aspect of life. Since every thought is an involvement in a particular aspect of outward existence, thought never finds time to understand itself. Thought never thinks itself; it always thinks others. We never see at any time our own mind contemplating its own self. It always contemplates other persons, other things and other aspects of life. There is a peculiar proclivity of thought by which it rushes outward into the objects of sensual life, externally, into persons and things, and never can know what it is itself. How can the mind know what another thing is when it cannot know what it itself is? If you cannot know what you are, how can you know what others are? But this is life - a great confusion and a mess and a conglomeration of involvements in the objects of sense. This is called Samsara, the aberration of consciousness in spatio-temporal externality.
We are to free ourselves from this mess of involvement, through a deeper diagnostic technique applied to our own life; and this is the purpose of Upanishad. The difficulty of this achievement is well-known. Every one of you knows what this difficulty is. Just as you cannot peel your own skin from the body, you cannot dissociate yourself from the conditions of life. But such a feat has to be performed in this superpsychic technique known as Upanishadic contemplation of 'being'.
The beginning of the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad is, thus, a rise of thought into the inward principles of outward sacrifice as advocated in the Brahmanas of the Vedas: What is a sacrifice; what is a ritual; what is a performance; and what is an action? When this is understood in its principle, its inward significance, it becomes commensurate with human thought; it becomes inseparable from mind; it becomes a part of one's psychic life. You will find, on a careful investigation of the matter, that anything that you do is involved in a process of thought. It may be a religious ritual or a worship, a performance or a sacrifice, or it may be a secular deed - it makes no difference. It is mind that is working in a particular fashion; - that is all, and nothing more, nothing less. So, unless the mind in its essentiality is probed into, human action is not understood. The Upanishad is a revelation of the inner principles of life as manifest in actions of a variegated nature. The ritual of the Brahmanas is contemplated in the Upanishads. The Vedic sacrifice, or, for the matter of that, any kind of religious performance, is a symbol, ultimately, which is the point of departure in all esoteric approaches to religion. External religion is symbolic of an internal principle which is true religion, towards which the Upanishad drives our minds. This departure is to be found in every religion in the world. The symbolic character of human activity and religious performance is brought out in a study of esoteric principles, which is the philosophy of life. The activities of human life are symbolic in the sense that they are not representative of the whole Truth, but manifest only certain aspects of Truth. Every action is involved in cosmic relations of which very few are brought to the surface of one's notice when the action is really performed. We always think that an action is motivated by an individual or a group of individuals towards a particular relative end which is visible to the eye and conceivable by the mind, but never do we imagine for a moment that there can be farther reaches of the tentacles of this action, beyond the reach of the human eye and mind and our little action can really be a cosmic deed, that God can see what we do, and the whole universe can vibrate with the little word that we utter. This is a difficult thing for us to understand; and the Upanishad explains it to bring to the purview of our consciousness these inward secrets of outward action, telling us that the outward sacrifice is symbolic of an inward contemplation of Universal Reality.
The Upanishads are embodiments of different types of contemplation on Ultimate Truth, and so is the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad. The beginning of the Upanishad is a contemplation of the inward meaning of a great sacrifice described in the Brahmanas, known as Asvamedha Yajna. It is an external performance of a religious character for the purpose of achieving higher results in the form of celestial enjoyment, etc., but, the Upanishad tells us that the proper approach to the aims of human life, such as ultimate satisfaction, delight, etc., need not be the method of the Brahmanas, which is only symbolic, and there should be a technique more affiliated to the nature of Reality than is the external action of the Brahmanas. The sacrifice known as the Asvamedha signifies the consecration of a horse in a large ritual performance, mostly undertaken by princes and kings in ancient times for the purpose of name, fame etc. in this world and heavenly exaltation hereafter. The Upanishad, however, tells us that its meaning is something quite different and more profound. What we see with our eyes and what we do with our deeds are indicative of a deeper aspiration in our minds, and what we actually seek is not pleasure, not satisfaction in the ordinary sense, not power, not name or fame, because all these are transient and tantalising.
Everything passes away; nothing in the world can last. Everything shall end, one day or other. What are these joys in heaven? What is this power this world? What is this name and status? They are mirages; they are nothing but husk, because they pass like the wisp of wind. And how is it possible for the soul to ask for that which is perishable and vanishes the next moment? Will any wise person crave for a perishable joy? How could anyone engage oneself in activities, performances, religious or otherwise, which are capable of promising only apparent joys, which rob us of all our strength and then land us in sorrow most unconceivable? What is the real aspiration of the soul of the individual? What is it that it really needs? What is it that it hungers for? It is difficult to answer this question. The child cannot answer the question, "What do you need?" "I want a sweetmeat, a sugar candy, a toy". What else can the child say? Such seems to be the reply of the untutored mind, the illiterate soul, sunk in the darkness of ignorance which speaks in terms of name, fame, power, wealth, rejoicing, diversion, gain, pleasures - whether they are real and lasting, or not, it cares not. It asks for pleasure, which shall end in a complication from which it is diffcult for one to free oneself.
The Upanishad promises us a freedom which is above the turmoil of all earthly existence. It can make us happy perennially under every condition, even after death, not merely in this life. In fact, the Upanishad assures us that death is not a bar and not a fear. There is no such thing as death as we think of it. Death is another kind of process which is intended for the training of the soul in its march to a greater perfection; and perfection is what we seek, not pleasure. This is what the Upanishads teach us; that is what the Brhadaranyaka contemplates in vast detail.
The knowledge proclaimed in the Upanishad is a science which deals with the removal of sorrow. Thus, it is a knowledge which is different in kind from the learning that we usually acquire or the knowledge that we gain in respect of the things of the world. It is not a science in the ordinary sense of the term. While there are sciences and arts of various kinds, all of which are important enough, and wonderful in their own way, they cannot remove sorrow from the human heart, root and branch. They contribute to the satisfaction of a particular individual, placed in a particular constitution, in a particular type of incarnation, but they do not go to the soul of the person concerned. In the sense of the science of the soul, the Upanishad is also called Atma-Vidya or Adhyatma-Vidya. It is different from other Vidyas or learnings like Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology etc., because all these latter pertain to objects of sense, the perceived world. Adhyatma-Vidya or the science of the Self pertains not so much to the object-world which is the field of the operation of the senses, as the Subject which is the ultimate conditioning principle of every perception of every kind. The objects that are perceived by the senses are conditioned by the processes of perception, and the very process of perception is determined by the nature of the perceiver, and so it is important that the nature of the perceiver is known directly; because when the perceiver is known, everything connected with the perceiver also is known. If, fortunately for us, the objects that are perceived are in some way determined wholly by the character of the perceiver, the knowledge of the Self would be the knowledge of the whole cosmos. Towards this end, the Upanishad takes us by hand, gradually.
The grief of the mind, the sorrow of the individual is not brought about by outer circumstances. This is a very important lesson we learn from the Upanishad. We do not suffer by incidents that take place outside. We suffer on account of a maladjustment of our personality with the conditions of life, and the knowledge of this fact is supernatural and super-sensual. What has happened to us cannot be known by us, because it has happened to 'us' and not to somebody else. We cannot know what has happened to others because we cannot know what has happened to us, for who is to know our own selves? This is the crux of the whole matter, towards which the Upanishad is to take us.The Upanishad, to reiterate, is the science of the Self, studied not for the sake of a diversion of the intellect or a satisfaction of the understanding, but for freedom of the spirit and removal of sorrow, utterly. The Adhyatma-Vidya about which we hear so much in fields of spiritual living is not 'a kind' of Vidya, just one of the branches of learning, but the Mother of all the branches of learning, including every other learning that can be conceived of in this world of sense, understanding and social living.
The Brhadaranyaka Upanishad, particularly, attempts to explain the various processes of bondage and liberation. It tells us how we are bound and how we are to get free; and it goes to the very cause ultimate, of the bondage of the soul. Our bondage is not merely physical or social. It is a more deep-rooted condition which has been annoying us through centuries and through our repeated births and deaths. Anything that we do in the outer world does not seem to be an adequate remedy for this sorrow of ours, because the sorrow has not come from outside. We can have a bungalow to prevent us from suffering from rain and sun and wind; we can have daily food to eat; we can have very happy and friendly social relationships; but we can also die one day, even with all these facilities. Nobody can free us from this fear. This is the greatest sorrow of the human being, that he has apparently everything but there is some secret sorrow of his which can swallow up every other satisfaction - that death can catch hold of a person, and no one can save him then.
What is this dependence of the individual on a circumstance over which no one has control; and why does death come, why is that sorrow? Why is there any kind of inadequacy felt in life at all. This is the subject of analysis and study in the Upanishad, for the purpose of bringing to our own self a knowledge which is not a learning or information about things, but an enlightenment about our own self. It is again to be repeated that this enlightenment is not about any other person or object, but about our own self. It is an understanding of oneself, an enlightenment of oneself, an illumination of oneself; and when this illumination takes place, it is expected that everything connected with the self also gets illumined automatically.
The bondage of the self is intrinsically involved in the structure of the individual. We bring sorrow with us even when our birth takes place; and it is often said that we bring our death also together with our birth. The meaning is that all experiences - joys, sorrows, including our last moment of life - all these are a fructification of circumstances with which we are born from the mother's womb. We are born under certain conditions, and they are the seeds of what will follow later, so that the entire life of ours may be said to be an unfoldment of that which is present in a seed-form at the time of our birth. We do not pass through newer and newer experiences unexpectedly, as it were, but they are all expected things only. Every experience in life is expected, as a corollary is expected from a theorem in mathematics. It follows; it has to naturally follow, logically, from the principle enunciated. Likewise, the experiences of life are natural phenomena that follow logically from the circumstances under which we are born. And these circumstances which seem to be powerful enough to condition our future are again the consequence of certain antecedents, and so on. There is, thus, a vicious circle, as it were, in which we are caught up, so that we cannot know which is the cause and which is the effect of any event or experience.
This vicious circle of suffering is Samsara, the sorrow of the soul, and it cannot free itself from this sorrow by merely undergoing experiences through births and deaths, because the experiences in life, the sorrows and the joys, whatever they be, are powers which come out automatically from the nature of individual existence, and unless this character of existence as the individual is studied, its sorrow cannot be diagnosed, or eradicated.
The knowledge that is of the Upanishad is thus inseparable from the 'being' of the self. This is the characteristic difference of the Upanishadic wisdom, the Adhyatma-Vidya. It is not a knowledge that one acquires 'about' a thing, but it is knowledge which is inseparable from the very 'being' of him who owns this knowledge. It is knowledge of Reality, Satta-Samanya, as it is sometimes called - General Existence. Knowledge of Existence itself is the knowledge announced in the Upanishad. It is not knowledge of any person, an object or the structural pattern of anything. It is a knowledge of 'being'. It is a Consciousness of Existence which is going to be the freedom of the spirit. It is in this sense, perhaps, that we call the ultimate Reality as Satchidananda - Existence-Consciousness-Bliss. It is a Consciousness of ultimate Existence which is at once Freedom and Bliss. It is not a definition of any person or individual form. The nature of Satchidananda about which we have heard so much, is not a definition of any particular condition of life. It is not also a description of the happiness of the human mind. It is not a future condition that we are going to enter. It is a description of Eternity itself where 'being' and 'knowledge of being' become one and the same, where there are no sufferings, obviously. We cannot separate our own consciousness from the consciousness of our 'being', for instance. We are, and we are also aware that we are. Our awareness that we are cannot be isolated from the fact of our 'being'. Our 'being' and the knowledge of our 'being' are inseparable, so that 'knowledge' is 'being'. This is the type of knowledge that the Upanishad promises to give us. It is, thus, something unique. Towards this end the Upanishad, the Brhadaranyaka, girds up its loins.
In the beginning, there is an attempt to describe the Asvamedha Sacrifice by identifying the consecrated horse with the universe as a whole. The creation of the universe may be compared to a sacrifice which is symbolically performed by a ceremony through rituals; and when it is contemplated it becomes an attunement of consciousness with the ultimate nature of creation. This, in outline, is the description of the process of creation. The forms, names and phenomena which we see and pass through, are a reversal of the nature of Reality, a reflection, as it were, of the Original through some medium, so that we see everything topsy-turvy and never as it really is. This is a fact which escapes our notice often, that we can see a thing and yet it can be upside down in all the features presented to the perceiving senses. Though we may be seeing the object, we may not visualise it properly. Thus, any achievement in this world of sense-perceptions may not be regarded as an ultimate acquisition, even as a collection of many reflections in a basket is not equal to the acquirement of anything substantially.
The description of the creative process, afforded in the Upanishad, in its First Chapter, is very grand and comprehensive. The exposition has some resemblance to the Purusha-Sukta of the Veda, where the Cosmic Sacrifice, which is creation, is said to evolve gradually, stage by stage, and touch every aspect of the universe, animate as well as inanimate. Not only the animate and inanimate existences, but also social organisations and human activities - all these are comprehended in this process of manifestation we call creation.
We have, then, a very pertinent point expounded of a similar nature where the character of sense-perception is described, in the analysis of which we are interestingly told that there is a complete reversal of the order of Reality in all types of sense-perception. The cart is put before the horse whenever we see anything with our eyes, so that we are in a world of confusion, misunderstanding, and, therefore, necessarily, sorrow. Where the understanding is insufficient, sorrow has to come automatically. The senses do not perceive the world correctly. This is what is made out subsequent to the description of the creation of the universe, and this description is symbolic in its nature, like a story which goes, but its essence is simple enough to understand; that, as we see our face in a mirror, where the right is seen as left and the left as right, the thing is not contacted in its reality. There is a right and left reversal, as it were, in the perception of things, and the object which we congnise or perceive is really not in its proper context or position in the scheme of things. We are wrongly apprehending it as an object 'outside', while what has really happened in perception is something different. The object of sense-perception is the Ultimate Subject really, and we erroneously regard it as an 'object'. How it is the Subject, and how it is not the object, we shall see when we study this section as we come to it. The objects of perception are really subjects, says the Upanishad, and this is the mistake that we make - the non-recognition of subjectivity even in what is regarded as an object.
Then we have, as the Upanishad proceeds, the subsequent outcome of this principal exposition in the First Chapter, namely, the Second Chapter, where we are not told anything new. It is only an elaboration of the principle which is precisely stated in the earlier one. As a matter of fact, the main content of the Upanishad is in the First, the Third and the Fourth Chapters. The Second is a secondary elaboration, and the Fifth and the Sixth are like an appendix and are not of much importance from the point of view of philosophical study, though they are very significant in one's practice of higher meditations. The central portion of the Upanishad is in the First, Third and the Fourth Chapters, which contain the peak of human thought, and offer an exposition of the highest philosophy the human mind has ever conceived. The discussions that take place in the court of King Janaka, under the leadership of Sage Yajnavalkya, touch upon almost every subject relevant in spiritual life, all following a graduated technique of development of thought from the lower to the higher until the highest Universal is reached. The outward is described first, the inward afterwards, and the Universal finally. This is the system followed in this Upanishad, especially in the central portion, the Third and the Fourth Chapters. This is precisely the way in which we have to approach things. The outward, the inward and the ultimate follow logically in the course of study. Though from the point of view of the evolutionary process or the chronological order of the descent of the individual from the Universal, we may say that the outward is the last and the inward is the intermediary link, the Universal being the first, yet, in our studies we would profitably go from the lower to the higher. We should not jump from the higher to the lower, because the higher is not known to us when the lower is not transcended. The lower can be seen and apprehended in a certain way, to the extent it has become the content of one's direct consciousness. So it is better to follow the inductive method of logic, in some sense, so that we proceed from more acquainted things towards less acquainted things, from particulars to generals, from
the visible to the invisible, from the sense-world to the rational realm and then to the spiritual field. This is the methodology of the Upanishad, the Brhadaranyaka, particularly, in the central portion; and it concludes with the grandest proclamation ever made, in the conversation between Yajnavalkya and his consort Maitreyi, known as the Maitreyi-Vidya, popularly, where a staggering description of the Reality is given to us. Perhaps, the discourses of Yajnavalkya are incomparable in literary beauty combined with profundity of thought.
This is to give a bare outline of how thoughts are developed in the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad. We shall take up the study of the First Chapter in its proper order and consider, as the tradition goes, the meaning of the invocatory verse: Om ! Purnamadah purnamidam purnat purnamudacyate; purnasya purnamaddya purnameva-avasisyate: 'That is Infinite, this is Infinite; from the Infinite does proceed the Infinite. On removing the Infinite from the Infinite, the Infinite alone remains. This is the chant of invocation which is recited at the beginning of this Upanishad. It is also chanted at the end of the study. This is the tradition. And this Mantra, this chant, occurs in the Upanishad itself, a very interesting piece, which rounds up and piles infinities over infinities in a little recitation. Infinity plus Infinity is Infinity. It does not mean, then, two Infinities. Infinity minus Infinity is Infinity only; it does not mean zero. And Infinity divided by Infinity is Infinity, again. There is no mathematics of the empirical type or the geometry of space-time in the Infinite realm. The Infinite is incapable of mathematical calculation, and therefore incapable of logical understanding, because mathematics and logic are inter-related - they are sister sciences. The invocatory chant tells that the Infinite alone is; and all this creation that has come from the Infinite is also Infinite. It is a wonder how the Infinite can come from the Infinite. That process of coming, also, is Infinite; and if this Infinite that is this creation is supposed to be the outcome of the Infinite which is the cause, and if we suppose, in a human fashion, that the Infinite has been taken away from the Infinite by way of creation, the answer is that what remains after creation, also, is the Infinite. This is another way of saying that there is no creation at all, but we cannot be told this truth suddenly, since we see creation with our eyes. So, by a process of reductio ad absurdum, as we have it in geometry, the conclusion is arrived at that the Infinite cannot move and does not move, and therefore there is no evolution or involution within it. The perception of the evolutionary process and the act of creation is relative to the condition of the individual, which fact cannot be enquired into unless one transcends individuality. The difficulty of knowing this secret lies in that the effect cannot know the cause. The enquiry into the Infinite is like trying to climb on one's own shoulders, which cannot be done, because the enquirer into the Infinite is an effect or, at least, stands in the position of an effect. The effect is conditioned by many factors, and unless these factors are known, that which transcends the factors cannot also be known. We cannot go behind the veil which covers our eyes, the veil of conditioned perception. The Infinite, the Reality, cannot be visualised by the apparatus of human understanding, because of the conditioning categories limiting human understanding. Mathematical and logical understanding are conditioned by the assumption of a three-dimensional space and a one-dimensional time. We cannot escape these hypotheses. Space is three-dimensional; it cannot be one-dimensional. And time moves in a linear fashion from past to future. This is how we think, and we cannot think in any other way, whether or not this is the only possible way of thinking. These limitations of thought prevent us from knowing what is the Infinite. Therefore, it is only an appropriate symbol that can explain what has really happened, not logic. Ultimately, all mystical expositions are symbolic; they are not just logical, and cannot be conveyed by argument, but they can be communicated in some way by image, art and story, and such media which touch the soul better than logic or mathematics. Thus, in this symbolic fashion, the chant tells us that the Infinite rolls within itself, and this rolling process also is the Infinite itself, like the ocean rumbling within itself, and even the rumbling is the ocean alone. So, the Infinite is, and everything is said when we say this, and nothing more can be said - Purnamadah, purnamidam: Know it as 'That which is', and say not anything more. Any attribute or adjective that we add to it is only going to diminish its connotation and not add to its glory. Say that 'It is', and enough is it. Such is the Infinite. The Infinite was, the Infinite is, and the Infinite shall be; nothing else can ever be.
Om Santih Santih Santih - '0m! Peace, Peace, Peace'. We always recite this peace chant three times, indicating that there should be peace in the three realms, or in three ways, or freedom from the three sources of trouble. We have three principal kinds of trouble, and all these three are to cease and peace is to prevail. We have trouble from within; trouble from without; and trouble from above. This threefold problem is known as Tapatraya. If there is a heavy flood, or there is an earthquake, a thunderbolt, or a destruction of this kind caused by factors beyond human range, such catastrophe is referred to as supernatural - Adhidaivika-Tapa. When troubles come from outside, as those from animals, reptiles, wicked persons, etc., they are known as Adhibhautika-Tapa. When troubles come from inside, such as illness, sorrow born of mental confusion, and the like, they go by the name, Adhyatmika-Tapa. They
merely appear to be three, from outside. There is a threefold appearance of a single problem, and it cannot be solved by any amount of intellectual logic, because it is ingrained in the very being of the individual. May the Vidya, the Wisdom of the Upanishad bring peace by causing the cessation of this threefold sorrow. May there be Peace everywhere.
The Upanishad proper begins with the contemplation of the sacrifice, Asvamedha. The Veda, in the hymn called the Purusha-Sukta, contemplates the Universe as a vast Sacrifice of God. Creation is an 'othering' or self-alienation of the Absolute, as it were. Here is a symbolic concept of the Original Sacrifice. The Purusha, the Supreme Being, became an 'other' to Himself in the act of the manifestation of the Universe. But, the Supreme was 'as if' an 'other', but not truly, for He, nevertheless remained as the Absolute, Self-Conscious Being, and He knew Himself as 'I-am'. Even in the Biblical parlance we have the description of God as 'I-am-That-I-am'. One cannot say anything else about God. 'I-Am' is the highest description of God, but the Absolute is supposed to be transcendent even to this condition of 'I-amness' of the Universal Nature, because the state of 'I-am' is Self-consciousness, though it is Universal. So, in the phraseology of the Vedanta, a distinction is drawn between this Universal 'I-am' condition and the Absolute as it is, the distinction between Brahman and Ishvara, spoken of in this philosophy.
The Cosmic Sacrifice of the Purusha-Sukta is an indication to us of the way in which a ritual can become a spiritual meditation, or a spiritual meditation itself can be interpreted as a magnificent ritual. The Brahmanas of the Veda, ritual-ridden as they have been, are brought to a point of contemplative apotheosis in the Aranyakas and the Upanishads, and here it is that every kind of action is identified with a form of sacrifice, and action made a part of inward contemplation, so that action becomes a process of thought, rather than a movement of the limbs of the body. Every activity is a psychological function; it is not just a physical process. This is what we have to understand when we convert action into a contemplation. The originally Existent Being thought an Idea, a Being inseparable from Consciousness. The Purusha-Sukta tells us that God became all the Cosmos (Purusha evedam sarvam), and the created beings contemplated God as the Original Sacrifice. (Yajnena yajnam-ayajanta devah) - by Sacrifice did the celestials contemplate the Sacrifice. This is, in some way, an anticipation of a subsequent enunciation of a similar process in the Bhagavadgita, when it says that the Absolute is the Supreme Sacrifice, contemplated universally, as also performed individually in the spirit of divine participation (Brahmarpanam brahma havih, brahmagnau brahmana hutam, brahmaiva tena gantavyam brahmakarma samdhina).
The act, the process and the end towards which the action is directed are all single in their essence, and they are not even a tripartite or a threefold process. It is a single development of Being which is impartite. This contemplation which was originally initiated in the Purusha-Sukta, as the Cosmic Sacrifice, may be said to be the Mother of all other concepts of sacrifice, or Yajna in the Indian tradition, or perhaps any other tradition of this type. The offering up of oneself is the core of the Sacrifice, and, thus, the highest Sacrifice is supposed to be self-sacrifice, not the sacrifice of outward material or anything that one 'possesses'. The offering of what we have is a lower sacrifice in comparison with the sacrifice of what we are. This is the Jnana-Yajna, or the knowledge-sacrifice that is spoken of in the Bhagavadgita and such other scriptures. The Purusha-Sukta is, therefore, a contemplation of a Jnana-Yajna as if performed by God Himself in the act of creation or a universal Self-alienation.
A similar contemplation is envisaged in the beginning of the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad, where the Asvamedha Sacrifice is made an occasion for a spiritual contemplation. The Asva, or the horse, consecrated in the sacrifice, is identified with Prajapati, or the Creator of the Universe, the Virat or the Hiranyagarbha of the later Vedanta. And in the very description that we find in the commencement of the Upanishad, the details of the parts of the horse are identified with the details of the Universe outside, so that here is a purely symbolic contemplation. The ritual becomes a Cosmic Act, and the horse of the Asvamedha Sacrifice is the Prajapati of the Veda. The Creator is the object of contemplation. In the beginning, this contemplation is religious in the sense that there is an 'externalisation' of the Idea of Prajapati, as a transcendent Creator of the Universe, but later it becomes wholly spiritual, where the meditator identifies himself with Prajapati, the All-Being, the Creator, so that the Upasana (worship) becomes a Self-contemplation, Adhyatma-Vidya, once again.
The Upanishad takes us from ritualistic concepts to religious adorations, and then to spiritual visualisations. There is, again, a gradual ascent of thought, from the outward to the inward, and from the inward to the Universal. We withdraw from the outward mode of behaviour to the inward psychological factors which determine these external modes of behaviour, and then we contemplate the Being that is precedent even to psychological behaviour. What we do outside is determined by what we think in our minds, and what we think in our minds is conditioned by what we are in our true selves. So, there is a process of the rise of contemplative action from the outer realm of name, form and action to the inward thought-processes of the individual, and to thought-process in general, leading to 'being', not merely to the individual's apparent being, but to the Being of all beings; which the Upanishad would describe as Satyasya Satyam, or the Truth of all truths.The Upanishads do not regard anything as absolutely untrue. Everything is true, but relatively so. There is a passage from the lower truth to the higher truth. The Upanishads have a strange way of envisaging things. The True alone prevails everywhere. Truth alone succeeds - Satyameva jayate - not untruth, because untruth is not. Therefore, the rise is from a lesser wholeness of truth to the larger wholeness which is above it. Actually, we reach, in the end, the Ultimate Wholeness which is Brahman, the Absolute. And also, simultaneously, it is an ascent of the soul from one condition of joy to another condition of joy. We do not rise from sorrow to joy, because sorrow is a misconceived tendency to happiness. It is a misplaced form of being which comes to us as a grief or agony. Just as untruth is not, sorrow also is not, because they are misplaced values, and when they are placed in their proper contexts, they look beautiful. As totally ugly things do not exist in the world, absolute sorrow also does not exist. An ugly thing is a misplaced value, again. When a thing is not properly placed, it looks ugly. When the very same thing is placed where it ought to be, it becomes the beautiful, so that perfection is the Dharma (law) of the Upanishad gospel, and it sees perfection everywhere. The enlightenment of consciousness to this Perfect Being is the entire process of Upanishad wisdom.
Om purnam adah, purnam idam, purnat purnam udacyate; purnasya purnam adaya puram evavasisyate.
Om Santih! Santih! Santih!
That is Full; this is full. From the Full does the Full proceed. After the coming of the Full from the full, the Full alone remains.
Om. Peace! Peace! Peace!
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The symbolic description here is one of the process of creation. How things come; and what it is that we see with our eyes. Where are we living? What is the connection between the effect and the cause? What is our connection with the Universal Being? What is the relationship between the individual and the Absolute? All these points are discussed in a pithy and pointed way, in a few passages, commencing from the Brahmana, or the section of the Upanishad that we are to study now.
naiveha kimcanagra asit mrtyuna vedam avrtam asit, asanayaya, asamaya hi mrtyuh; tan mano' kuruta, atmanvi syam iti. So'rcann acarat, tasyarcata. apo' jayanta arcate vai me kam abhud iti; tad evarkasya arkatvam; kam ha va asmai bhavati, ya evam etad arkasya arkatvam veda.
Originally, there was nothing. Death was enveloping everything. That is all the meaning, literally, of this sentence. In the beginning of things, what was there? Nothing was there. There was a devouring, all-consuming death-principle, as it were; nothing else can we conceive. In the Veda, also, there is this very same point reflected in the Nasadiya Sukta, which proclaims that, in the beginning, there was neither existence, nor non-existence. What was there, originally? Darkness enveloped, as it were, because there was not the light of sensory perception. What we call light is nothing but the capacity of the senses to perceive. When the senses cannot perceive, we say, there is no light. In pitch darkness, a kind of light exists; but the eyes are incapable of catching the ray of that light. That frequency is quite different from the one that is necessary for the eyes to perceive. So, when there was no possibility of external consciousness, when there was no sensory activity, when there was no distinction between the subject and the object, when the seer was not distinguishable from the seen, what was there? We can imagine for ourselves, what can be there? If we are not to perceive anything outside, what would be our condition? We cannot imagine it, because such a condition has never been seen; but it would be a veritable abolition and obliteration of all consciousness, because every kind of consciouness is equivalent, in our case, with externality. Therefore, in the condition of non-objectivity which is the origin of things, the cosmic beginning of things, where the distinction between the seer and the seen was not marked, where the one commingled with the other, where one entered the other, where the two could not be distinguished, for reasons obvious, what was there? Nothing was there! Naiveha kimcanagra asit: Originally, nothing was there, because our idea of 'something' is an 'object'. There is no object present, because the object enters the subject, and vice versa. What was there, then? If nothing was there, could you tell me that it is capable of definition in some way?
The devouring death-principle is the element of hunger which grasps objects. Here, hunger does not mean merely the appetite for edible dishes like rice, barley, etc. Here is a metaphysical principle. Here, the hunger is a cosmic element. It is not an operation of the biological spleen or the liver or the stomach of the individual. What is here intended is the principle of grasping. The object can be regarded as the hunger of the soul of the individual. There was nothing except the desire to grasp the object, if at all one could say that anything was there. Asanayaya is the hunger of the individual to grasp, absorb, contact, abolish and devour the object.
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